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MULTI-STAKEHOLDER FRAMEWORKS FOR RECTIFICATION OF NON-
COMPLIANCE IN CLEANING SUPPLY CHAINS: THE CASE OF THE 
CLEANING ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK * 
ABSTRACT 
There is now an expanding body of literature on the significant problem of business 
non-compliance with minimum labour standards including ‘wage theft’. Extended 
liability regulation beyond the direct employer is seen as one solution to this non-
compliance in fragmented but hierarchically organised industries — such as the 
cleaning industry. This paper uses empirical evidence to assess the effectiveness of one 
such regulatory scheme, the Cleaning Accountability Framework (CAF), in 
addressing non-compliance with minimum labour standards (including provisions of 
the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the Cleaning Services Award 2020). We find 
that CAF has been successful in identifying and rectifying certain non-compliance, 
improving working conditions for some cleaners involved in the scheme. We synthesise 
the key success factors of CAF in view of envisioning the adoption of such co-
regulation frameworks in other industries. We also propose legal reforms that will 
support change across the cleaning industry. 
I INTRODUCTION 
There is now an expanding body of literature on the problem of business non-
compliance with labour standards including ‘wage (and superannuation) theft’ and 
other forms of labour exploitation.1 Frequently, the fragmented or ‘fissured’ nature of 
the industry is discussed as a significant barrier to the rectification of underpayment 
and other exploitation due to the lack of resources of governmental and union 
regulators to monitor and/or take enforcement action, including prosecution, against 
the vast multitude of non-compliant smaller businesses who are the direct employers 
near the base of the industry structure.2 One mechanism deployed as a solution to this 
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1 See, eg, Stephen Clibborn, ‘Multiple Frames of Reference: Why International Student Workers in 
Australia Tolerate Underpayment’ (2018) Economic and Industrial Democracy (forthcoming); Stephen 
Clibborn and Chris F Wright, ‘Employer Theft of Temporary Migrant Workers’ Wages in Australia: 
Why Has the State Failed to Act?’ (2018) 29(2) Economic and Labour Relations Review 207; Laurie Berg and 
Bassina Farbenblum, Wage Theft in Australia: Findings of the National Temporary Migrant Work Survey 
(Migrant Worker Justice Initiative, November 2017) (‘Wage Theft in Australia’); Laurie Berg and Bassina 
Farbenblum, ‘Remedies for Migrant Worker Exploitation in Australia: Lessons from the 7-Eleven Wage 
Repayment Program’ (2018) 41(3) Melbourne University Law Review 1035. This article does not consider 
the relative merits of the terms ‘wage theft’ and ‘underpayment’ but uses them interchangeably to refer 
to the situation where an employer does not pay a worker their full, legal, payment entitlements. The 
broader term employer ‘non-compliance’ is also used to denote the situation where an employer does 
not comply with legal standards including standards relating to payment of workers. 
2 David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: How Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can be Done to 
Improve It (Harvard University Press, 2014).  For prior research on the fragmented workplace see Judy 
Fudge, ‘Fragmenting Work and Fragmenting Organizations: The Contract of Employment and the 
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non-compliance in fragmented but hierarchically organised industries — such as the 
cleaning industry3 — is extended liability for non-compliance (beyond the direct 
employer) throughout supply chains and business networks.4 At its best this is a 
proactive measure which is used to effectively harness the influence of lead firms that 
hold a strategic position in supply chains/business networks to ensure that all 
businesses directly engaging labour comply with labour standards. An established 
body of literature has now also investigated the legal regulation of supply chains for 
employment policy purposes.5  
A formal legal approach to enforcement has been a focus of research so far since 
voluntary schemes of self-regulation, notably those using private auditing, often fail 
to produce the desired outcome in terms of adherence to labour standards6 and can 
even be subject to falsification.7 However, we know much less about the possibilities 
of leveraging the influence of lead firms to create ‘co-regulation’ schemes. In these 
schemes stakeholders jointly attempt to address the issue of the enforcement of legal 
requirements. Co-regulation corresponds to cooperative forms of steering in which 
                                              
Scope of Labour Regulation’ (2006) 44(4) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 609, 622–5, 635–46; Jill Rubery, Jill 
Earnshaw and Mick Marchington, 'Blurring the Boundaries to the Employment Relationship: From 
Single to Multi-Employer Relationships' in Mick Marchington et al (eds), Fragmenting Work: Blurring 
Organizational Boundaries and Disordering Hierarchies (Oxford University Press, 2005) 63. 
3 Criminal penalties have also been proposed as a solution to wage theft. Extended liability and criminal 
penalties could be combined and are not mutually exclusive. This article does not deal further with the 
issue of criminal penalties but focusses on the extended liability solution. 
4 The Fair Work Ombudsman (‘FWO’) deploys this mechanism in litigation by pleading that price 
maker businesses are accessories under s 550 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (‘FW Act’) to non-
compliance by price taker non-compliance with labour standards. See Tess Hardy and John Howe, 
‘Chain Reaction: A Strategic Approach to Addressing Employment Noncompliance in Complex Supply 
Chains’ (2015) 57(4) Journal of Industrial Relations 563 (‘Chain Reaction’). 
5 Guy Davidov, ‘Indirect Employment: Should Lead Companies Be Liable?’ (2015) 37(1) Comparative 
Labour Law & Policy Journal 5; Chris F Wright, ‘Should Corporations be Responsible for Labour 
Standards in their Supply Chains? (Deben las empresas ser responsables de las normas laborales en sus 
cadenas de suministro)’ (2016) 40(463) Analisis Laboral, 10; Chris F Wright and William Brown, ‘The 
Effectiveness of Socially Sustainable Sourcing Mechanisms: Assessing the Prospects of a New Form of 
Joint Regulation’ (2013) 44(1) Industrial Relations Journal 20; Igor Nossar et al, 'Protective Legal 
Regulation for Home-Based Workers in Australian Textile, Clothing and Footwear Supply Chains' 
(2015) 57(4) Journal of Industrial Relations 585; Michael Rawling and John Howe, 'The Regulation of 
Supply Chains: An Australian Contribution to Cross-National Legal Learning' in Katherine VW Stone 
and Harry Arthurs (eds), Rethinking Workplace Regulation: Beyond the Standard Contract of Employment 
(Russell Sage Foundation, 2013) 233; Phillip James et al, ‘Regulating Supply Chains to Improve Health 
and Safety’ (2007) 36(2) Industrial Law Journal 163. 
6 Daniel Berliner et al, Labor Standards in International Supply Chains: Aligning Rights and Incentives 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015); Richard M Locke, The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting 
Labour Standards in a Global Economy (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
7 Gale Raj-Reichert, ‘Safeguarding Labour in Distant Factories: Health and Safety Governance in an 
Electronics Global Production Network’ (2013) 44 Geoforum 23; Andrew Crane et al, ‘Governance Gaps 
in Eradicating Forced Labor: From Global to Domestic Supply Chains’ (2019) 13(1) Regulation & 
Governance 86. 
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actors aim to achieve common objectives.8 Co-regulation was initially conceived of as 
involving state regulators and worker collectives9 but more recently as collaborations 
between state regulators, worker collectives and lead firms.10 The actual operation and 
effectiveness of these forms of co-regulation needs to be investigated.11   
Accordingly, this article explores the capacity of powerful actors in supply chains to 
leverage their economic power to influence labour standards; examines the 
development and implementation of a co-regulation scheme based on cooperation 
and consensus; reveals the central importance of worker engagement mechanisms to 
overcome the well-known weaknesses of social auditing and suggests legal reform 
that would assist in redressing non-compliance with labour standards. This article 
makes these contributions  by investigating the operation of a scheme of regulating 
whole national supply chains, the Cleaning Accountability Framework (CAF), and 
assesses the effectiveness of that scheme. The CAF is an independent multi-
stakeholder organisation that seeks to promote good labour practices in the cleaning 
services sector.12 CAF stakeholders including building owners, building managers, 
contract cleaning companies, employee representatives and the state (through the Fair 
Work Ombudsman (‘FWO’)) collaborate in a jointly developed and implemented 
program. The CAF scheme is largely directed at securing compliance with minimum 
labour standards (including the national employment standards in the Fair Work Act 
2009 (Cth) (‘FW Act’) and the federal Cleaning Services Award 2020).13  
Through a detailed evaluation of a range of data on all the key components of the 
CAF, we conclude that CAF has been largely successful in rectifying certain non-
compliance, improving working conditions for some cleaners involved in the scheme.  
Based on that success, we then argue for the application of a two-tier structured 
scheme (adapted from a Textile Clothing and Footwear sector scheme) which would 
embed CAF within a set of mandatory cleaning industry supply chain laws. 
Furthermore, the CAF model might be considered for adoption in other hierarchically 
organised industries such as the security industry, transport and logistics industry, 
construction industry and potentially the personal care services industry.  
                                              
8 Reinhard Steurer, ‘Disentangling Governance: A Synoptic View of Regulation by Government, 
Business and Civil Society’ (2013) 46(4) Policy Sciences 387. 
9 Matthew Amengual and Janice Fine, ‘Co-Enforcing Labor Standards: The Unique Contributions of 
State and Worker Organizations in Argentina and the United States’ (2016) 11(2) Regulation & 
Governance 129; Janice Fine, ‘Enforcing Labor Standards in Partnership with Civil Society: Can Co-
Enforcement Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed?’ (2017) 45(3) Politics & Society 359. 
10 Sarah Kaine and Michael Rawling, ‘Strategic “Co-Enforcement” in Supply Chains: The Case of the 
Cleaning Accountability Framework’ (2019) 31(3) Australian Journal of Labour Law 305.   
11 See Tess Hardy and John Howe, ‘Partners in Enforcement? The New Balance Between Government 
and Trade Union Enforcement of Employment Standards in Australia’ (2009) 23(3) Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 306, 330–1; Hardy and Howe, ‘Chain Reaction’ (n 4). 
12 See Cleaning Accountability Framework (‘CAF’), Introduction to CAF Certification Agreement (CAF, 
2019). 
13 Fair Work Commission, Cleaning Services Award 2020, MA000022, 30 April 2020. 
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The article proceeds as follows: Part II identifies the challenge of extensive business 
non-compliance with labour standards in the market generally and in the Australian 
cleaning industry in particular.  We argue that a key aspect of the problem in the 
cleaning industry is the way supply chain pressures drive down labour standards.  
Part III outlines our project design/methodology. Part IV explains and assesses the 
adequacy of the CAF regulatory framework and evaluates some of the measures taken 
in practice to identify and rectify non-compliance. In Part V we review the key success 
factors for multiple-stakeholder co-regulation schemes, concluding that while the 
CAF methods have had some level of success, they need a more robust financial and 
regulatory underpinning in order to make a broader impact on labour abuses in the 
Australian commercial cleaning industry. 
II EMPLOYER NON-COMPLIANCE, AN ONGOING ISSUE 
Australia has a system of minimum wages and conditions enshrined in National 
Employment Standards in the FW Act (and in federal modern award provisions). By 
and large these provisions apply to most employers in the Australian private sector.14  
Australian business non-compliance with these binding provisions has become a 
major issue.15 Academic research,16 government inquiries17 and the media18 have 
documented extensive underpayment and other business non-compliance with 
legislated labour standards. The FWO uncovered widespread evidence of exploitative 
practices by 7-Eleven franchisees in 2014. Since then there has been a number of 
worker-underpayment revelations.  Some of the country’s most iconic companies 
including Woolworths, Qantas, Myer, Bunnings and the Commonwealth Bank have 
admitted to, or have been caught committing, wage theft. Those companies have 
                                              
14 The FW Act does not apply to some employers in Western Australia, and where an enterprise 
agreement is registered the relevant award does not apply. The FW Act also applies to the 
Commonwealth public service but the focus of this article is on business non-compliance. 
15 Clibborn and Wright (n 1) 207. 
16 Berg and Farbenblum, Wage Theft in Australia  (n 1). 
17 Senate Education and Employment References Committee, Parliament of Australia, A National 
Disgrace: The Exploitation of Temporary Work Visa Holders (Report, 17 March 2016). Three States (Western 
Australia, South Australia and Victoria) have concluded separate inquiries into wage theft laws, 
concurrent with a federal inquiry into the issue, prompted by a Queensland report: Education, 
Employment and Small Business Committee, Parliament of Queensland, A Fair Day’s Pay for a Fair Day’s 
Work? Exposing the True Cost of Wage Theft in Queensland (Report No 9, 56th Parliament, November 2018).  
18 See for example Peter Ryan and David Chau, ‘Woolworths Investigated After Admitting it Underpaid 
5,700 Staff up to $300 Million’, ABC News (Online, 30 October 2019) 
<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-10-30/woolworths-underpays-5700-staff-up-to-300-million-
dollars/11652656>; ABC Online, ‘Woolworths Contractors Underpaying Cleaners in “Serious 
Exploitation” across Tasmania, Inquiry Finds’, ABC News (Online, 14 February 2018) < 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-02-14/woolworths-cleaners-underpaid-tasmanian-inquiry-
finds/9444916>; Madeleine Heffernan, ‘Fair Work Takes Myer to Cleaners Over Underpaid Wages’, 
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 30 May 2016). 
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subsequently been required by the FWO to make wage backpayments to underpaid 
staff.19 
The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) estimates that wage theft practices 
affect as many as one-third of Australian workers, becoming part of the new business 
model for large corporations.20 Furthermore, wage theft has implications for workers 
beyond those that are directly affected. As Peetz explains:  
[I]f one group of workers can be paid well below the legal minimum, that opens 
opportunities for employers to apply pressure to other workers, using the implicit or 
explicit threat of replacing them with lower-paid workers.21 
It appears that Australia is not the exception, with wage theft also being a major 
problem in parallel developed economies such as the United States of America22 and 
the United Kingdom.23 Migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to exploitation 
with considerable evidence mounting that underpayment of this subset of workers is 
systematic and widespread in the Australian labour market.24 One major survey of 
4,322 temporary migrants found that a substantial proportion of those migrants (30% 
of those surveyed) were paid around half the legal minimum ($12 per hour or less).25 
Wage theft is particularly prevalent in low-wage, low-skill job markets such as those 
in the retail, hospitality, horticulture, cleaning and security industries. Clibborn and 
Wright26 state that these types of fragmented industries tend to have common 
‘structural characteristics’ such as 
weak or absent unions, extensive casual employment and subcontracting, intense 
commercial competition, labour cost minimisation as a dominant strategy, and other 
features associated with poor job quality. 
In the majority of those industries including the retail, cleaning, horticulture and 
security industries, work is given out through supply chains or other business 
networks (such as franchises) to smaller businesses and workplaces with low union 
density. Those direct employers are then subject to considerable commercial pressures 
                                              
19 Eugene Schofield-Georgeson and Michael Rawling, ‘Industrial Legislation in 2019’ (2020) 62(3) Journal 
of Industrial Relations 425, 426. 
20 Australia Council of Trade Unions (‘ACTU’), Wage Theft — The New Model for Big Business (ACTU, 
2019).  
21 David Peetz, The Realities and Futures of Work (ANU Press, 2019) 292–3. 
22 David Weil, ‘Creating a Strategic Approach to Address Wage Theft: One Academic’s Journey in 
Organizational Change’(2018) 60(3) Journal of Industrial Relations 437, 439. 
23 Clibborn and Wright (n 1) 208, citing Monder Ram et al, Non-Compliance and the National Living Wage: 
Case Study Evidence from Ethnic Minority and Migrant-Owned Businesses (Low Pay Commission, 2017). 
24 Clibborn and Wright (n 1) 208; Bassina Farbenblum and Laurie Berg ‘Migrant Workers’ Access to 
Remedy for Exploitation in Australia: The Role of the National Fair Work Ombudsman’ (2017) 23(3) 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 310. 
25 Berg and Farbenblum, Wage Theft in Australia (n 1) 5. 
26 Clibborn and Wright (n 1) 212. 
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passed down the supply chain or through the contractual network that increase the 
risk of business non-compliance with labour standards.27 
Given the extent of the wage theft issue in the Australian labour market, clearly the 
established methods of addressing business non-compliance are inadequate and give 
rise to the need for innovative further measures such as CAF and others to address 
this issue. 
A Non-Compliance is Rampant in the Cleaning Industry 
Contract cleaning provides an exemplar of an industry whose characteristics and 
market structure match those listed by Clibborn and Wright as associated with non-
compliant labour practices.28  One such characteristic is the nature of the business 
relationships within the contract cleaning supply chain. Commercial building owners 
(such as retail and investment banks, property development companies and other 
large investors such as industry superannuation funds), as well as their tenants (which 
include well known consumer brands), are at the ‘top’ of the chain. Commonly, the 
building owners and tenants outsource the cleaning of the property to specialised 
cleaning companies, either directly or mediated through a facilities management 
company. The use of an external facilities manager adds another tier to the supply 
chain.29 In some cases, the cleaning companies subcontract to smaller companies or 
individual contractors. When asked about their role in the cleaning supply chain a 
facilities manager (property manager) explained that:  
Well, as a property manager we tender cleaning contracts when we think they need 
doing. So, then we go through the process of selecting the appropriate cleaner, in 
consultation with the owner, obviously. Then … once the cleaner's in place and 
working, the Facilities Manager controls that contract … makes sure that they're doing 
what they're supposed to be doing or what they're getting paid to do. Then obviously 
we pay the cleaner out of funds that we receive out of the building and handle the 
normal issues that come with a contract.30  
In other words, commercial decisions regarding cleaning contracts are not simply 
determined by owners or tenants in negotiation with cleaning contractors but are 
further moderated through the facilities management company paid by the building 
owners. Therefore, facilities managers are another entity that have power to influence 
the pay and conditions of cleaners. 
In addition to complexity and fragmentation facilitated by its multi-tiered nature, the 
contract cleaning sector reflects many other ‘structural characteristics’ conducive to 
                                              
27 See generally Clibborn and Wright (n 1) 214; Kaine and Rawling (n 10). However we note that wage 
theft is not confined to small business employers at the base of business networks — large employers 
can also steal wages from their direct employees: see, eg, Ryan and Chau (n 18). 
28 Clibborn and Wright (n 1) 212. 
29 Kaine and Rawling (n 10) 315. 
30 Interview with facilities manager (2018). 
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labour exploitation.31 Union activity in contracting has met only limited success. In 
the early 2000’s, the Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union (LHMU — 
now known as the United Workers Union — UWU) undertook a concerted campaign 
known as ‘Clean Start’. In an acknowledgement that traditional collective bargaining 
involving parties at the bottom of the supply chain did not address the realities of the 
industry (namely the economic power of entities at the apex of the supply chain for 
cleaning services), the campaign attempted to exert pressure on building owners to 
only grant contracts to cleaning companies that were party to a Clean Start enterprise 
agreement. While successful in negotiating a Clean Start agreement with 50 cleaning 
companies and obtaining federal government support, there was significant 
opposition from property owners. They claimed that the Clean Start campaign had 
created a two-tier industry in which those companies paying above award wage rates 
(through the Clean Start agreements) were being disadvantaged. A specific concern 
was that building owners were not prepared to pay more in their contracts to cover 
higher wages.32 Despite the efforts of the union much of the sector remained outside 
Clean Start, creating a two-tiered market that did not address the key issue: the 
intensely competitive market in which cleaning companies were themselves often 
price-takers. 
The market for contract cleaning is sizeable and growing.33 It is also fiercely 
competitive, driven by low barriers to entry and a ready supply of low-skilled, low-
paid workers. This environment, in which price is a significant, if not overriding, 
consideration of building owners in the awarding of cleaning contracts, creates 
pressure for cleaning companies to tender for contracts at rates that are inadequate to 
fund compliance with award pay and conditions. This was succinctly summarised in 
an interview with a CAF Steering committee member who noted that: 
The economic pressures are relentless. Tenants and investors want a lower cost and 
increased return and the workforce, not uniquely but particularly, is very vulnerable. 
So they’re part-time. They’re casual. They’re foreign students. They’re women — 
English as second language. So just this vulnerability up against this incredibly 
powerful economic force.34 
Data collected from a stakeholder as part of this project revealed that of about 400 
tenders submitted by cleaning companies for contracts to clean large commercial 
buildings around Australia, more than 34 percent underestimated labour costs, 
and/or the per square metre cost of cleaning areas in the relevant building, and/or 
over-estimated the per square metre cleaning productivity rate. This gives rise to 
serious doubts as to whether the contractors who submitted those tenders could fulfil 
                                              
31 Clibborn and Wright (n 1) 212. 
32 Kaine and Rawling (n 10). 
33 In 2016/17 it was estimated that the sector would generate $8.6 billion in revenue and grow to $9.8 
billion over 5 years: Alen Allday, Commercial Cleaning Services in Australia (IBISWorld Industry Report 
No N7311, November 2016). 
34 Interview with Steering Committee Member (CAF, 2019). 
8 
the contract without either exploiting the cleaning workforce or making a loss on that 
contract. 
As a consequence, the contract cleaning industry has become infamous for sham 
contracting, underpayment and poor working conditions. In the report of the National 
Cleaning Services Compliance Campaign 2014-15, the FWO showed that the 
percentage of businesses that were non-compliant had ranged between 37 percent and 
40 percent between 2011 and 2015. Additionally, an investigation into sham 
contracting in 2011 found that over 21 percent of cleaning businesses were 
misclassifying employees, resulting in cleaners missing out on leave, superannuation 
and other entitlements.35  Aside from misclassification, work in the cleaning sector is 
characterised by casual and part-time engagement leading to underemployment 
despite increasing workloads.36 Altogether, work in the cleaning services sector 
matches many of the features associated with poor job quality. 
III METHODOLOGY 
In this article, we aim to evaluate the effectiveness of CAF in addressing non-
compliance with minimum labour standards for the cleaning workforce.37   
Our design followed the principles of action research. In action research, the 
researchers engage actively, along with operational members of the project, to 
promote change.38  In line with our objectives, action research combines the needs of 
the participating organisations with the production of high-quality research outputs 
with the objective of triggering transformative change.39 
Due to our role in the project, we were allowed unparalleled access to data and 
decision making at CAF. However, this comes with a need for self-awareness and 
reflection on how theory is elaborated and emerges from the ‘intervention’ to limit the 
bias associated with actively engaging in transformative change.40 In particular, it is 
important to clearly consider what role the research participants play in theory 
building. Considering our research objective, which was to provide an assessment of 
the implementation of CAF, we opted for a clear delineation where research 
participants were considered as ‘subjects’ and as such did not take part in the 
                                              
35 See FWO, National Cleaning Services Compliance Campaign 2014/15 Report (Report, March 2016). 
36 Iain Campbell and Manu Peeters, ‘Low Pay, Compressed Schedules and High Work Intensity: A 
Study of Contract Cleaners in Australia’ (2008) 11(1) Australian Journal of Labour Economics 27.  
37 This objective and the data on which the article draws are part of a larger project funded through a 
Linkage grant from the Australian Research Council. The main objective of the project was to contribute 
to the implementation and improvement of CAF and evaluate its outcome. 
38 Mark Saunders, Phillip Lewis and Adrian Thornhill, Research Methods for Business Students (Financial 
Times Prentice Hall, 7th ed, 2009); Edgar H Schein, Process Consultation Revisited: Building the Helping 
Relationship (Addison Wesley, 1999). 
39 Schein (n 38). 
40 Colin Eden and Christine Huxham, ’Action Research for the Study of Organizations’ in Stewart R 
Clegg and Cynthia Hardy (eds), Studying Organization: Theory and Method, (SAGE Publications, 1999) 
526. 
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elaboration of theory.41 The authoring team was thus limited to academics and did not 
include other members of CAF. This facilitated a process of theory building that was 
distinct from that of the intervention research, with significant time dedicated to our 
theoretical elaboration. This process took place outside of the settings of the research.42 
This was possible because none of the authors allocated more than 20 percent of their 
time to the research project. 
Given our extensive access to data, we were also able to limit bias by triangulating the 
information collected through several sources, including interviews and observation, 
as well as access to and work on project documents. We conducted 39 semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders, including building owners, facility management, 
cleaning contractors, the relevant union, the CAF core team, the CAF steering 
committee, and tenants (see table 1 for details). While the interview guide varied 
depending on the stakeholders, the main topics covered included work standards 
issues in the cleaning supply chain, involvement in remediation (including CAF), the 
stakes for CAF, approaches to remediation, efficiency of CAF,  the relationship 
between the CAF core team  and other stakeholders and the future of CAF. We also 
conducted two group interviews with cleaning workers, focused on their perception 
of key issues in the industry, the role of CAF in relation to remediation and tools that 
could help address issues. We also combined participant and non-participant 
observation. Participant observation was in the form of the facilitation of workshops, 
participation in CAF organised workshops and project meetings, as well as 
membership of CAF committees (steering committee, accreditation committee, and 
standards committee), totalling over 50 hours of participant observation across 33 
meetings. Non-participant observation concerned mainly the workers’ induction 
meetings (10 meetings of one hour each). Regarding documents, we not only had 
unrestricted access to a database of 3,792 documents related to the project, but also 
contributed to improving processes and procedures through ongoing revisions of 
related documentation. For instance, the research team did a full review of the pricing 
schedule for commercial buildings (see below for a detailed description) and was then 
involved in defining a new pricing schedule for the retail industry. The main 
documents that were useful sources for the current article include the certification 
documents (audit reports, certification correspondence and workers’ engagement 
reports) and the successive iterations of the procedure documents (remediation 
procedure, CAF standard, pricing schedules, etc).   
Our approach conforms to best practice in action research, which is typically 
conducted in successive phases of diagnosing, planning, taking action and 
                                              
41 John Rowan, ‘A Dialectical Paradigm for Research’ in Peter Reason and John Rowan (eds), Human 
Inquiry: A Sourcebook of New Paradigm Research (John Wiley and Sons, 1981) 93. 
42 Eden and Huxham (n 40); Laurel Richardson, ‘Writing: A Method of Inquiry’ in Yvonna S Lincoln 
and Norman K Denzin (eds), Turning Points in Qualitative Research: Tying Knots in a Handkerchief, 
(AltaMira Press, 2003) 379. 
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evaluation.43 By doing so, we were able to gain full access to data, while also providing 
an assessment of efficiency and determining how the framework can be improved in 
order to minimize non-compliance. 
 Table 1: Semi-structured interviews 
Stakeholder type Number of Interviews Steering Committee 
Members 
Building owner 6 2 
CAF core team 5 3 
Cleaning contractors 10 5 




Tenants 3 n.a. 
Union 3 3 
Total 36 14 
 
IV THE CAF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION  
In light of the extensive problem of non-compliance with minimum labour standards 
in the Australian cleaning industry, some form of additional regulation of the industry 
to improve compliance was warranted. The CAF came into existence in Australia in 
2013 to begin to address the problem. It attempts to construct a regulatory model to 
supplement the formal legal framework in an effort to overcome the inadequacies of 
that framework. The CAF model developed around a number of tools and protocols 
that reinforced minimum standards (determined through collaboration among 
stakeholders in the cleaning supply chain) and created a system of monitoring and 
enforcement of these standards (through engagement with workers and leveraging of 
supply chain dynamics). Currently, there are 6 instruments that constitute the core of 
the CAF regulatory model: the core principles, the star standard, the pricing schedule, 
                                              
43 Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (n 38). 
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the external audit process, the worker engagement protocol, and the remediation 
procedure. The core principles, the 3 Star Standard and the pricing schedule together 
constitute the tools through which CAF has determined and articulated minimum 
standards. The external audit process and the worker engagement protocol are the 
basis of monitoring compliance with the standards. Finally, the remediation 
procedure forms the basis of the enforcement activities undertaken by CAF which are 
prioritised by severity of non-compliance with the minimums (detailed below). 
In that sense, CAF is an attempt to create a co-regulatory framework that overcomes 
the limitations previously observed in such initiatives.44 It seeks to do so by relying 
on an ensemble of instruments and enforcement mechanisms that aim at correcting an 
over-reliance on audits45 that has been widely criticised, notably in relation to global 
supply chains. Social auditing practices, when applied as the main enforcement 
mechanism, failed to demonstrate a strong contribution to remediation of labour 
issues in such contexts,46 often being unsuccessful in detecting or correcting labour 
issues.47 This is notably the case because of excessive control by companies over the 
process, risk falsification and no incentive for significant/lasting remediation.48 CAF 
also answers a call ‘to engineer governance initiatives that respond to the specific 
forms of complexity typical of domestic chains’.49 
 Since 2013 the standard setting, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that have 
been developed by the CAF have been improved and adjusted, taking stakeholder 
views into consideration. The establishment of the framework and its adjustments 
have been conducted through a model of consensus standard setting.  This means that 
before any element of the framework is set, CAF seeks to gain the agreement of CAF 
stakeholders. The advantage of this consensus approach to multi-stakeholder decision 
making is that it facilitates stakeholder buy-in and ownership, which in turn can 
promote compliance. However, the consensus model has at times hampered and 
significantly slowed the operation of CAF.    
Each of the CAF mechanisms is examined below, articulating the regulatory 
framework that CAF uses to conduct the rectification of business non-compliance and 
                                              
44 Edward J Balleisen and Marc Allen Eisner, ‘The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-Regulation: How 
Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public Purpose’ in David A Moss and John A 
Cisternino (eds), New Perspectives on Regulation (Cambridge, 2009) 127, 130–3. 
45 Jolyon Ford and Justine Nolan, ‘Regulating Transparency on Human Rights and Modern Slavery in 
Corporate Supply Chains: The Discrepancy between Human Rights Due Diligence and the Social 
Audit’ (2020) 26(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 27, 28. 
46 Thomas Clarke and Martijn Boersma, ‘The Governance of Global Value Chains: Unresolved Human 
Rights, Environmental and Ethical Dilemmas in the Apple Supply Chain’ (2015) 143(1) Journal of 
Business Ethics 111. 
47 Genevieve LeBaron, Jane Lister and Peter Dauvergne, ‘Governing Global Supply Chain Sustainability 
through the Ethical Audit Regime’ (2017) 14(6) Globalizations 958; Berliner et al (n 6); Locke (n 6); Raj-
Reichert (n 7). 
48 LeBaron, Lister and Dauvergne (n 47). 
49 Crane et al (n 7) 101. 
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improve the working conditions of cleaners and how it supplements the limitations of 
social audit approaches.   
A CAF Core Principles 
The Core Principles are at the heart of the CAF certification scheme. They set out the 
principles of best-practice for stakeholders involved in the cleaning services and 
property industries. Participants in the CAF certification scheme are expected to 
uphold these core principles at buildings undergoing certification and across their 
own business operations. These principles include decent treatment of workers, a 
workplace free from discrimination, enabling freedom of association, having 
grievance mechanisms for workers, cooperation to ensure workplace health and 
safety, reasonable workloads and performance indicators, job security at change of 
contract, wages and conditions above minimum standards recognised as best practice, 
conditions for subcontracted staff are no less favourable than direct employees, the 
contract price is sufficient to enable contractors to meet all of their legal obligations 
and stakeholders who are committed to continual improvement of sustainable 
practices are to be recognised.50 These core principles are similar to the code of 
conduct often implemented in parallel with social audit mechanisms. While not 
sufficient in isolation,51 such mechanisms are still important in setting the base for a 
common understanding of what CAF is aiming to achieve. 
B CAF 3 Star Standard 
CAF has developed a 3 Star Standard, which provides a mechanism to certify 
individual buildings. The 3 Star Standard focuses on six areas of compliance:  
1) Labour (wages and conditions, job security, visa compliance);  
2) Responsible Contracting (sustainable pricing, record keeping, transparency about 
subcontracting and oversight of contractor compliance);  
3) Workplace Health and Safety (a safe working environment, compliance with 
legislation, inductions and training, bullying and harassment);  
4) Financial Viability (whether appropriate financial viability checks have been 
undertaken);  
5) Worker Engagement (education, consultation and freedom of association); 
                                              
50 ‘The Cleaning Accountability Framework: Core Principles’, Cleaning Accountability Framework (Web 
Page, 2019) <https://www.cleaningaccountability.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CAF-Core-
Principles.pdf>. 
51 Clarke and Boersma (n 46). 
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6) Remediation (ensuring all relevant stakeholders play an active role in investigating 
and resolving compliance issues).52  
The 3 Star Standard has been developed to ensure compliance with legislative 
requirements determined in the applicable award and relevant legislation including 
the FW Act. For example, the first mentioned area of compliance, labour, focuses on 
wage, tax and superannuation obligations of employers, as well as legal record-
keeping and payslip requirements. This compliance area also verifies whether 
cleaners have the right to work in Australia, and whether they are working in 
compliance with their visa conditions. Similarly, in the other areas of compliance, the 
benchmark is determined by obligations set out in the applicable award and relevant 
legislation. In effect, adhering to the 3 Star Standard implies compliance with 
minimum legal requirements. Despite this, there was still the need for a consensus to 
be built among stakeholders as to which aspects of the minimum requirements would 
be prioritised and enforced within the standard and how the requirements around 
worker engagement would be operationalised. Over time, CAF intends to develop  4 
and 5 Star Standards which set out aspirational requirements that go beyond 
minimum legal compliance. 
The other instruments created by CAF aim at ensuring that the 3 Star Standard is met.  
The pricing schedule is used by CAF members on an ongoing basis to allocate 
contracts to cleaning contractors. To have a building certified, CAF initially 
undertakes two simultaneous processes that, combined, constitute the CAF audit 
process: an external audit of the cleaning contractor by an independent auditor and a 
worker engagement process. To date, almost invariably, these processes have 
uncovered non-compliance with the CAF 3 Star Standard. There is then an annual 
health check for certified sites that updates the information initially collected and 
includes ongoing worker engagement activities. Finally, the remediation procedure 
allows for the rectification of issues identified during the certification process, or 
down the track through the annual health checks and ongoing worker engagement. 
C The Pricing Schedule 
The competitive tendering process in the cleaning industry, during which cleaning 
contractors bid on tenders put out by building owners, has seen cleaning contractors 
lower their prices to unsustainable levels. This has resulted in wage payments below 
the legal minimum and excessive workloads. To counter this trend, CAF has 
developed a ‘contract quantum adequacy’ tool to ensure that the price stated by the 
cleaning contractor is sufficient to cover minimum labour rates and entitlements and 
does not result in unacceptable workloads. The pricing schedule incorporates two 
benchmarks based on aggregated industry data.  It is a key tool that leverages the 
                                              




power of the organisations at the apex of the cleaning supply chain as building owners 
and facilities managers make tender decisions informed by a process that expressly 
considers capacity for labour compliance. The first benchmark specifies the minimum 
level of labour on-costs that are expected to be incurred by the contractor. This is 
meant to ensure that the contract price is sufficient to cover worker entitlements. The 
second benchmark specifies the maximum productivity rate per square metre for a 
given property type and area. This makes visible the minimum amount of labour 
hours required to clean a specific property. Comparison of the calculated on-cost and 
productivity rates with industry benchmarks acts as a ‘red flag’ for potential non-
compliance. Contracts priced lower than the established minimum are likely 
breaching labour standards. The disclosure of labour costs and workloads is 
mandatory. A building cannot be CAF certified unless the pricing schedule is 
completed as part of the tendering process. This creates transparency and an increased 
likelihood that cleaners will be paid their entitlements and that workloads are 
sustainable. Use of the productivity schedule will lead to less divergence in prices 
submitted as part of the tendering process, and shift emphasis from cost as the 
primary determinant to other qualitative factors such as quality of service. As a result, 
it also operates as an important tool for aligning incentives within the client 
organisation between cost and ethical concerns, where conflicting incentives was one 
of the limitations preventing social auditing from being more than a legitimation 
exercise.53 
D The External Audit Process 
The external audit of the areas of compliance of the CAF 3 Star Standard is conducted 
by an externally engaged auditor, chosen by CAF, and paid for by the building 
owners. The auditor collects data to verify compliance or otherwise with the 3 Star 
Standards. The audit process includes the collection of data and documentation that 
can be provided electronically by the cleaning contractors, facilities managers and 
building owners; fieldwork that includes interviews with stakeholders; and finally, 
the issuing of a report by the auditors to the CAF Certification Panel.  
Through the external audit process, cleaning contractors demonstrate compliance in 
various ways, including by providing the auditor with an overview of relevant 
employment policies, procedures and management systems with a specific focus on 
the relationship between cleaning workers and the cleaning contractor. For instance, 
they are asked to provide evidence of compliance with the CAF 3 Star Standards.  
Similarly, for building owners and managers, record keeping pertains to documents 
that capture the relationship between the owner/manager and the cleaning 
                                              
53 Locke (n 6); Berliner et al (n 6); Lone Riisgaard and Nikolaus Hammer. ’Prospects for Labour in 
Global Value Chains: Labour Standards in the Cut Flower and Banana Industries’ (2011) 49(1) British 
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contractor, such as a record of investigation and remediation of unauthorised 
subcontracting, if any has been detected, as well as the completion of the pricing 
schedule, and a signed declaration from cleaners stating that they have received 
documents (such as employment contracts). A notable element of the CAF audit 
system is that it limits the control of companies over the process since, while the 
auditor is paid by the company, it is chosen and reports its results directly to CAF who 
then informs the company of the outcome and is in a position to request remediation 
before the 3 star rating is granted. 
E Worker Engagement Protocol  
Fundamental to the frequent inability of workers to realise their rights is the absence 
of avenues that allow them to express their voice.54  The lack of worker voice has been 
highlighted as a key limitation of social auditing.55 The importance of including 
workers’ voice is illustrated by the research on ‘worker-driven social responsibility’; 
where workers themselves are the driving force behind creating, monitoring and 
enforcing workplace standards. For instance, the Fair Food campaign initiated by the 
Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW) in the United States is a membership-based 
organisation of farm workers that emerged to address the abusive recruitment and 
working conditions facing (predominantly migrant) tomato pickers.56 The campaign, 
driven by the farm workers, relied on strong alliance building with consumer groups 
and human rights activists to persuade major brands to adopt the Fair Food Code of 
Conduct.57 A binding agreement between the CIW and the buyer companies 
underpins the code, which requires the buyers to cease business dealings with 
growers that do not comply with the Fair Food Code.58 
In recognition of the need to provide workers with a strong voice in the process of 
enforcing social standards, the worker engagement component of CAF is critical to 
the identification of potential non-compliance with the CAF 3 Star Standard and hence 
minimum labour standards. It is the process through which the audit of labour 
standards is verified with data collected from workers. It is a process that is 
undertaken by CAF and the UWU. It consists of a minimum of two worker 
engagement meetings (30 minutes each) and a cleaner survey. CAF liaises with the 
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building owner, facilities manager, cleaning contractor and UWU to organise these 
meetings. 
The first worker engagement meeting serves as an introduction to CAF and takes 
place with all stakeholders in the room. This allows UWU, building owners, facilities 
managers and cleaning contractors to explain why they are involved in CAF.  Surveys, 
CAF representative nomination forms and a CAF survey are distributed at this 
meeting, and a secure box is left for cleaners to place them in. Surveys and CAF 
representative forms are collected from the box following this first meeting.   
For the second worker engagement meeting only CAF, UWU and the relevant workers 
are present. This tests, and ultimately demonstrates, the commitment of stakeholders 
involved in CAF to freedom of association. This meeting is a chance for cleaners to 
share their experiences without their employers in the room. A CAF representative is 
elected by the cleaners in each building to ‘represent and advocate on behalf of their 
colleagues.’59 This role is recognised through the payment of an allowance added to 
the hourly rate of the representative. The ‘CAF Representative Allowance’ is 
ultimately paid by the property owner who is invoiced by the cleaning contractor, as 
the representative receives the allowance in their normal pay through the contractor.60  
Finally, the information gathered from the two meetings and the survey is collated 
into a ‘worker engagement report’ that forms part of the audit documentation and 
evidence of compliance or otherwise. 
It is not known if participants see this CAF worker representative mechanism as a 
method of compliance with the legislated Work Health and Safety (WHS) 
requirements forworker consultation, representation and participation.61 The CAF 
representative mechanism does not have a specific WHS focus but does incorporate a 
WHS aspect to it. Further, an overall aim of CAF is to ensure substantive compliance 
with legislative requirements, including those relating to WHS. Therefore,  the CAF 
representative mechanism certainly has the potential to be expanded in order to serve 
the worker representation functions for the purpose of complying with WHS 
legislation (even if this is not what is currently envisaged). 
F Remediation Procedure 
The CAF Secretariat (consisting of a Chief Executive Officer and two compliance 
officers) undertake measures to follow up non-compliance issues revealed by the 
external audit and worker engagement processes in order to ensure that the 
businesses in question rectify the non-compliance and extend to cleaning workers 
their lawful rights and entitlements. A brief outline of the measures taken by CAF at 
                                              
59 CAF, CAF Worker Engagement Costs (CAF, 2020) 1. 
60 Processes relating to worker engagement have varied slightly over the course of the certification 
pilots and subsequent certification rounds.  
61 See Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW) pt 5.  
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this point are specified in the written remediation procedure.62 Once the CAF 
Secretariat complete following up the non-compliance, evidence of the rectification 
process, the worker engagement report and the external auditor’s report are provided 
to, and considered by, the CAF Certification Panel. If the panel is satisfied that the 
wages and conditions of cleaners at that particular site are in compliance with the CAF 
3 Star Standard, then the building is certified for a three year period. 
In terms of rectification, there are different courses of action depending on the 
seriousness of the issues. For the worst type of labour issues labelled in the procedure 
as ‘critical issues’ (such as modern slavery, which has ‘recently become prominent in 
public debate’63), the building owner is notified by CAF.64 CAF does not notify the 
cleaning contractor in order to protect cleaning workers and prevent any action by the 
cleaning contractor to hide the issue or destroy any evidence.64 There is some evidence 
from our interview data that certain building owners involved with CAF as well as 
cleaning contractors would prefer that the cleaning contractor is dealt with directly by 
CAF in the rectification process.65 However the raison d’être of CAF is to use supply 
chain leverage as an additional mechanism to rectify labour abuses,  further justifying 
the notification to the building owner.  
The next type of issue that is classified in the written procedure is a major or serious 
issue. Such an issue is where cleaners’ safety and well-being may be at risk and there 
is a major non-compliance with the CAF standard, a systemic or recurring issue, or a 
more complex non-conformance with the CAF Star Standard that requires further 
investigation and remediation. Examples of these major or serious issues include 
underpayment, significant increase in workload, significant freedom of association 
transgressions and bullying and harassment.66   
The procedure in relation to these major or serious breaches follows two initially 
different pathways depending on whether the contractor who directly hires the 
cleaning workers is CAF pre-qualified. Pre-qualification of a cleaning contractor 
means that that contractor has demonstrated to CAF that they have adequate 
management systems to support compliance with the 3 Star Standard when going 
through building certification audits and the capacity to participate effectively in the 
audit process and remediation process for CAF building certification.67   
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If the cleaning contractor is pre-qualified in this way, CAF notifies the cleaning 
contractor directly of any major or serious issues.68 The cleaning contractor is then 
given 10 days to investigate and report back to CAF with a corrective action plan to 
implement.69 For serious or major breaches where the cleaning contractor is not pre-
qualified, CAF notifies all relevant multi-stakeholder participants including the 
building owner/manager, the cleaning contractor and the relevant union. The 
relevant stakeholders then have to investigate the issues that CAF has outlined to 
them within 10 business days. 
The procedure then merges into one stream for both pre-qualified contractors and 
those contractors that are not pre-qualified. If the investigation by the cleaning 
contractor or stakeholders corroborates the issues raised by workers, CAF advises of 
an appropriate timeframe to remedy the issue and what evidence is needed to be 
provided to CAF. Here CAF can consult with the UWU and the CAF Certification 
Panel and if necessary engage an independent assessor.70 If the investigation does not 
corroborate the issues raised by cleaners, CAF recommends to the stakeholders at the 
site that they implement proactive measures to prevent those types of issues occurring 
in the future.71 
In the case of pre-qualified contractors, CAF then notifies the building owner or 
manager so that they know that the issues are being addressed and completes the 
worker engagement report that goes to the CAF Certification Panel.72 In the case of 
non-pre-qualified contractors this process is not necessary given the building 
owner/manager has been notified by CAF earlier and is involved in the investigation 
process. 
There is also a brief protocol for minor issues (such as insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate compliance with a CAF standard, cleaners not receiving pay slips or 
information sheets).73 The procedure does not involve an investigation by any 
stakeholder. Instead, CAF completes the worker engagement report that goes to the 
Certification Panel on these minor issues and the cleaning company is asked to 
remedy these issues as part of the certification process.74 
There is thus a clear coupling in CAF between the information collected through 
audits and the worker engagement process and remediation action, where, contrary 
to what has been observed in most social auditing schemes, there is a strong incentive 
to remediate to achieve and maintain the 3 star rating.  
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G Audit findings, Certification and Remediation 
We now turn directly to the evidence on the implementation of the CAF regulatory 
framework. The table below provides an overview of the audits undertaken and of 
the outcomes, notably including the number of issues identified. 
Table 2: Certification and issues for the period 2017–19  
 













A Grade Office 13 12; 1 on hold 60 4.62 
B Grade Office 4 2; 2 in progress 25 6.25 
Retail 7 7 57 8.14 
Total 24 21 142 5.92 
 
Table 2 presents the outcome of the audit process and the number of issues identified 
in total and in average. Altogether, while the average number of issues varies 
according to the category, issues were identified with all sites, with an average of close 
to 6 issues per audited site. However, the CAF certification committee certified all but 
one of the sites listed in the table after the cleaning contractor or building owner 
produced evidence to CAF that the non-compliance issues had been rectified. This 
demonstrates a direct impact of CAF: its capacity to detect issues and drive 
remediation. Considering the severity of some of the issues detected — see discussion 
below — this represents a significant improvement in the working conditions of 
cleaners at those CAF sites.  
Throughout the various rounds of certification, it became apparent that while there 
were issues singular to particular buildings and the number of compliance issues 
varied across sites, some issues emerged as more common than others.   The 10 most 
common issues identified through the audit process between 2017 and 2019 were as 
follows: 
1) Oversight of contractor compliance; 
2) Financial viability; 
3) Provision of information sheet; 
4) Underpayment; 
5) Right to work in Australia; 
6) Unsustainable workloads; 
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7) Leave policies and procedures; 
8) Record-keeping; 
9) Induction and training; and 
10) Freedom of association 75 
Notably these top ten most common issues include all four of the issues (pertaining to 
right to work in Australia, unsustainable workloads, underpayment and leave 
policies) that attract a ‘severe’ impact rating in a non-compliance rating system 
designed by CAF. That is, some of the most commonly identified issues are also rated 
by CAF as some of the most severe.  Furthermore, there were two common issues that 
became a point of particular contention: sick leave and payment for induction. These 
two appeared to fall into a grey area of compliance. The CAF standard requires 
compliance with the National Employment Standards in the FW Act and the Cleaning 
Services Award 2020 or the relevant collective agreement.76 
While the CAF 3 Star Standard notes compliance with ‘recording and providing leave 
entitlements’, the certification process revealed that there was a wide-ranging 
interpretation (or misinterpretation) of the notice provisions for taking leave in s 107 
of the FW Act. Subsections (1) and (2) of that section provide that an employee must 
give notice of the taking of leave to their employer ‘as soon as practicable’. Some 
cleaning contracting companies were requiring cleaners to notify of the intent to take 
sick leave in an unreasonable time-frame. That is, in some cases cleaners were being 
required to notify of an intended absence four hours prior to the commencement of 
their shift. This was particularly difficult for cleaners engaged on early morning shifts 
and resulted in the non-payment of sick leave in some cases. This may place an 
additional requirement on employee beyond s 107(2) of the FW Act which explicitly 
contemplates that notice may be given after the leave has commenced. 
Likewise, there was some dispute as to what constitutes appropriate paid induction 
— which occurs once an employment relationship exists — and what is better 
described as pre-employment activity. Through the audit process and follow-up 
investigations, CAF discovered that a common practice was to pay cleaners only for 
the on-site induction but not for activities off-site which could include things such as 
Work Health and Safety training and familiarisation with company policies. In the 
more extreme cases there appeared to be a requirement for new starters to undertake 
unpaid training that amounted to several shifts prior to official commencement.77 
The uncertainty around interpretation of the relevant legal requirements prompted 
the CAF Secretariat to move to developing more specific policies in both of these areas 
(sick leave and induction). These policies were aimed at proactively addressing a 
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76 CAF, Three-star Standard Restructure MT 181212 (CAF, 2018).  
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21 
prevalent issue. Firstly, CAF communicated the new policies to employers who had 
undergone the audits which found that a potential non-compliance had occurred.  
CAF compliant policies and guidelines were then able to become part of the 
subsequent remediation processes when an issue relating to sick leave or induction 
emerged at further sites through the audit process. The CAF model leave policy 
contains a table that breaks the issue into key dimensions and then lists the relevant 
provision of the FW Act, examples of current industry practice that CAF deems to be 
inconsistent with the law and finally a suggested approach for cleaning companies.78  
Similarly, the CAF guidelines for induction processes detail legal obligations 
regarding the payment of inductions, common practice that CAF deems non-
compliant with its standards and examples of practices that CAF would expect to 
constitute paid induction in comparison to pre-employment ‘recruitment related 
activities’.79 This policy development shows CAF engaging in interpretation of the 
legal minimums (on which its 3 Star Standards are based) and building that 
interpretation into its remediation processes. It also demonstrates arbitration by CAF 
between the interpretations of stakeholders and the overall goal of improving labour 
standards for cleaners. In this example, the CAF Secretariat took a more decisive role 
in the determination of a policy that became part of the minimum CAF requirements. 
It took this action out of concern that the overall goal was not being met by 
stakeholders autonomously. 
The worker engagement process was key to identifying issues during the audit and 
annual health check processes — particularly those which were subject to varied 
interpretation of the kind referred to above. The worker engagement aspect is a 
fundamental component of CAF and recognises that ‘the everyday experience of 
workers is a significant means of identifying noncompliance’.80 Indeed, all of the 18 
audits that contained written worker engagement reports revealed issues relating to 
non-compliance with the CAF standard. More significantly, the worker engagement 
reports uncovered potential non-compliance that was not captured through other 
aspects of the audit, with a number of these related to issues ranked with the highest 
severity rating. Specifically, 12 of the 18 pointed to concerns regarding ‘unsustainable 
workloads’; seven identified an issue with the taking of leave; one highlighted 
concerns with the right to work in Australia; one uncovered underpayment and three 
others pointed to the related issue of the use of Australian Business Numbers (ABNs).  
The more serious incidences of non-compliance with the labour component of the CAF 
standards were uncovered through the worker engagement process as a consequence 
of the information provided by cleaners to CAF in face-to-face meetings or through 
the survey. What is evident from the audit process and results is that the worker 
engagement process was pivotal in identifying potential non-compliance with the 
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CAF standard. Given the CAF standard is itself based on binding minima (including 
the Cleaning Services Award), the worker engagement process provides a greater level 
of assurance to parties throughout the supply chain that legal breaches will be 
uncovered than the other components of the audit alone. 
H Extent to which the Top of the Supply Chain is Leveraged 
Perhaps a key indicator of the effectiveness of the CAF scheme is CAF’s ability to 
leverage the influence of property owners at the top of the cleaning supply chain. The 
literature has for some time indicated that supply chains across various industries are 
already ‘regulated’ for private purposes by lead controlling firms at the apex of supply 
chains and that this influence of those lead controllers might be harnessed by 
regulators for the public purposes of addressing labour abuses.81  
Our research has found that this is the case in many of the supply chains in buildings 
whose owners are now participating in CAF. Prior to CAF involvement and 
intervention, owners of commercial buildings had mechanisms in place throughout 
the cleaning supply chain to ensure the quality of cleaning services. The facilities 
managers hired by building owners carry out the function of ensuring the cleaning of 
the owner’s building adheres to quality standards. Facilities managers use various 
mechanisms to ensure that the owners and their tenants quality requirements are 
quickly addressed. Many use automated systems which allow tenants, facilities 
managers or owners to log cleaning jobs when needed, including jobs to address 
omissions of cleaning work, deal with spillages or plan specific cleaning jobs.  
Alternatively, or in addition, facilities managers use a communication book for tenants 
and facilities managers to leave messages for cleaners.82 Also, facilities managers 
might discuss issues in person with a tenant or owner and launch the process of 
improving the cleaning services.83 In turn, facilities managers also tend to maintain 
consistent contact with the cleaning company representative in the form of a regular 
meeting — such as a weekly meeting — to relay feedback about the cleaning work 
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done by the cleaners on the site. The facilities manager also routinely conducts 
inspections of the site in conjunction with or in addition to these regular meetings.84 
Moreover, legislative intervention has meant that, to a degree, on some sites, the 
facilities managers have also begun to monitor cleaning contractors for the public 
purpose of ensuring compliance with mandatory WHS requirements.85 This is of 
course, mainly due to the owner’s liability for the health and safety of all workers on 
site including cleaning workers (regardless of their work status) under mandatory 
WHS laws.86 Compliance is attempted through a range of mechanisms including, at 
times, working with contractors on the implementation of WHS procedures.87 
However, these measures appear to be less embedded in facility manager practices; 
less extensive — at times mainly limited to, for example, proper site inductions for 
workers;88 not as clearly articulated; and less well understood by stakeholders (such 
as tenants) than some quality control systems.89 
The bifurcation of WHS requirements, on the one hand, and pay and conditions laws, 
on the other,90 has allowed building owners to silo compliance with WHS laws from 
their addressing of pay and conditions standards. Indeed as we have foreshadowed, 
in contrast to WHS laws, there is no clear-cut extended liability of lead controlling 
firms throughout supply chains for pay and conditions standards in Australia.91  
Perhaps as a consequence of this inadequacy of the regulatory framework, our 
research has found that, prior to CAF intervention, there was not any widespread use 
of the type of mechanisms discussed above (currently used to improve the quality of 
cleaning services and to a lesser degree WHS) to systematically detect non-compliance 
with pay and conditions standards.92 Rather, responsibility for pay and conditions has 
been pushed down the supply chain and as a consequence there has been a lack of real 
oversight of cleaners’ pay and conditions by parties up that chain. Building owners 
have placed responsibility for cleaning workers with the cleaning company and 
facilities manager and avoided knowledge of any non-compliance with labour 
standards altogether. Both owners and tenants were very clear that compliance with 
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pay and conditions standards was not their responsibility.93 For instance, when asked 
about who is responsible for cleaners’ working conditions, one owner indicated: 
Well obviously it’s the cleaning company. Then if there’s unrealistic expectations put 
on them, they would be put to the facilities manager. So it’s really between the facilities 
manager and the cleaner.94 
In turn, facilities managers place the responsibility for pay and conditions with the 
cleaning company. For example, when asked about their involvement in employment 
standards issues, a facilities manager stated: 
We don’t. Because we leave that to the contractor to do. Specifically, no I don’t think 
we get involved in it.95 
Further, an analysis conducted by CAF of 25 sites involved in the first and second pilot 
and the CAF certification program intake in 2019 found that lack of adequate oversight 
of contractor compliance was the most common breach of the CAF 3 Star Standard in 
those buildings.96 Yet, in most cases, either the building owner and/or their facilities 
manager are well positioned to influence working conditions in their buildings due to 
their experience in regulating cleaning quality and WHS by way of their strategic and 
influential position at the apex of Australian cleaning supply chains.97 Thus CAF has 
begun to fulfil an important function in encouraging building owners and their 
facilities managers to exercise this existing power and establish the necessary 
monitoring mechanisms in order to improve the labour law compliance of their 
cleaning contractors.  
This is not to say that CAF has uniformly requested building owner intervention in 
every instance of non-compliance identified by the labour standards audits and 
worker engagement meetings. Due to a level of resistance from some participating 
owners and their facilities managers,98 not only does the CAF remediation policy 
discussed above indicate the selective use of owner involvement, but CAF has also 
exercised its discretion to call on owner supply chain leverage in its post audit and 
post worker engagement follow up during the certification process. Indeed, CAF has 
increasingly taken a flexible approach depending on the level of cooperation that they 
are receiving from the various supply chain participants.99  
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For example, in one building certification process where the cleaning contractor and 
on-site facilities manager were not responsive in uploading documents for the auditor, 
CAF called directly on the head office of the building owner to request assistance with 
arranging for labour issues identified by CAF to be rectified. The building owner then 
organised to visit the site to meet with the cleaning contractor and site management.100  
In another instance of major non-compliance which took the form of systematic 
underpayment of wages and related superannuation, CAF requested action from both 
the building owner (an independent audit to identify the full scope of the 
underpayment) and the cleaning contractor (independent verification that the payroll 
system had been updated to reflect currently applicable wage rates) as a condition of 
certification.101 When the building owner was slow to act, CAF personnel reminded 
them that they may have accessorial liability for the wage and superannuation theft 
under s 550 of the FW Act due to their knowledge of these underpayments.102 In other 
words, CAF invoked mandatory accessorial liability laws to stir the building owner 
into action.   
However, at another site, where no major current issues were identified by the audit, 
the worker engagement process indicated that the cleaning workers were generally 
satisfied with their working conditions and there was high union density, CAF did 
not need to call upon the owner’s supply chain leverage; but, instead, worked with 
the cleaning contractor to rectify minor labour issues at the site.103  
In most, if not all, instances CAF appears to prioritise the overarching purpose of 
rectifying labour abuses and improving working conditions over process 
considerations such as leveraging supply chain power. Instead of a doctrinaire 
approach, CAF appears to be proceeding on the practical basis that it will work with 
whichever party in the supply chain it needs to in order to achieve its immediate goals.  
This appears to be working as CAF has, in the main, been able to rectify labour abuses 
and grant certification to the buildings involved. 
However, it may be that business owner monitoring of labour standards could be 
implemented more fully over time (if building owners become more familiar with, 
and less resistant to, CAF involvement) so that there is a more efficient use of CAF 
resources. If building owners fully cooperate with CAF and partially assume 
responsibility for monitoring labour standards in their own supply chains, this may 
help to streamline CAF input into the rectification process. The consensus required 
amongst stakeholders (including building owners) for it to be written into the CAF 
remediation procedure that the owner is to be notified in all instances of major labour 
issues (where the cleaning contractor is not pre-qualified) signals that some initial 
progress towards this broader use of owner influence and more efficient deployment 
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of CAF resources may have already begun. Moreover, CAF’s actions have been largely 
consistent with this written rectification procedure (which escalates the level of owner 
intervention according to the seriousness of the issue) indicating that CAF can 
demonstrate a rational approach to its case-by-case rectification of non-compliance.  
That CAF can demonstrate a consistent rectification process may help with the 
legitimacy of CAF in the eyes of stakeholders. Beyond that, if the CAF framework is 
considered more broadly, supply chain leverage is wielded through the power of 
multi-stakeholder mechanisms including through the Certification Panel and CAF 
Secretariat.104 But, as we have seen, there is still considerable scope for a much wider 
harnessing of building owner power in CAF and throughout the entire commercial 
cleaning industry. In particular, proactive monitoring measures taken by building 
owners to ensure such matters as quality of cleaning (discussed above) could be 
adapted to the task of preventing labour abuses.  
V THE SUCCESSES AND LIMITS OF THE CAF AND THE NEED FOR 
REFORM 
In this Part we synthesise the key success factors of the scheme to facilitate 
implementation of similar frameworks in other industries. We then explore some of 
the CAF’s limitations and suggest regulatory reforms that would support a more 
extensive application of CAF across the cleaning industry. 
A Key Success Factors of Co-Regulation Frameworks 
As Crane et al argue, labour abuses in supply chains have predominantly been 
described as a problem caused by supply chain complexity.105  They argue that there 
is a need to engineer governance initiatives that respond to typical domestic chains. 
CAF has succeeded in doing this by developing a framework that specifically seeks to 
address social standards in the Australian commercial cleaning supply chain. While it 
takes the particularities of this specific supply chain into account, a number of success 
factors exist that can be applied to domestic supply chains that share similarities with 
the commercial cleaning supply chain.  
Below, we synthesise the factors that are key to the successes of CAF to date. Our 
objective in doing so is to facilitate the adaptation of CAF to other industries.  
Industries to be targeted in priority should be those combining exposure to higher 
risks of labour abuses with a hierarchical supply chain structure, meaning that the 
organizations at the apex of the supply chain can drive enforcement of the standard.  
Such industries include the security, construction, transport and potentially the 
personal care industries. 
A first key success factor of CAF is the capability to leverage the power of the 
organisations placed at the apex of the supply chain. As discussed above, such power 
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will manifest in hierarchical supply chains where the organisations at the apex of the 
supply chain benefit from what is labelled as ’drive’ in the supply chain.106 It is also 
important to note that actors positioned at different levels in the supply chain might 
benefit from such power.107 This is exemplified in the case of CAF by the fact that both 
building owners and tenants can influence the decisions made by cleaning companies. 
This means that attempts to adapt the CAF framework to other industries should take 
into account the specificities of the supply chain of that industry and potentially target 
organisations placed at different levels of the supply chain. Another key question in 
relation to leveraging the power in the supply chain is that of the incentive to do so by 
participating organisations. In CAF there was a key business objective of avoiding 
reputational risks associated with poor labour standards down the supply chain. 
Nevertheless, research has shown that another key aspect in order to leverage drive 
was the question of the incentive for the supply chain lead-organisations to exert their 
power.108 One such incentive, which manifested in the case of CAF, is the reputational 
risk to the lead organisation.109 However, some organisations or industries are less 
exposed to such risks, meaning a lesser incentive.110 Efforts to adapt the CAF 
framework to other industries must take into account the degree to which lead 
organisations in the targeted supply chain are susceptible to the negative impact of 
reputational effects. 
A second essential success factor for CAF was that the standard was consensus-based 
and resulted from the collaborative efforts of all stakeholders. This was key to 
ensuring buy-in from participants and practical relevance. CAF organised this 
consensus-based approach through its structure, where each aspect of the standard 
and its implementation were decided and monitored by multiple-stakeholder 
committees (such as the certification committee, steering committee, etc).  This echoes 
former research indicating that leveraging the power of a lead firm is more efficient 
when conducted collaboratively across traditional sector boundaries.111 This was 
especially demonstrated in the capability of CAF to provide consensual 
interpretations of the legal framework regarding sick-leave and the payment of 
induction activities. However, we also noted that some of the outcomes of the 
consensual efforts were sometimes still contested, showing that communication about 
the standard is important and should be continued throughout its operation. 
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Third, worker engagement proved essential in exposing some of the worst labour 
practices within the supply chain. This was the case for the initial audit but also for 
the yearly health checks and for addressing issues that could arise during the year.  
This addresses one of the main limitations of supply chain audit systems which is that 
they can miss some key issues or even be subject to falsification.112 Our findings are 
supported by former, more generic findings, showing that workers’ voice mechanisms 
were essential in reporting issues in supply chains.113 The criticisms of the traditional 
code of conduct and social auditing approach show that worker involvement is not 
only critical in verifying audit findings, but that alternative approaches characterised 
as worker-driven social responsibility can help to shift the focus from protecting brand 
reputation towards protecting workers’ rights. The CAF framework provides an 
interesting mix of classic voice channels. Indeed, it falls under the category of non-
union employee representation, while addressing the limitations of such voice 
channels due to supply chain fragmentation.114 However, because the effort is multi-
stakeholder, it also has a connection with union voice, which has proven crucial in the 
implementation of diverse sorts of voluntary labour standard remediation 
frameworks.115  
Finally, our findings provide some interesting insights on how a successful framework 
can approach implementation and remediation. CAF found a delicate balance 
between the objectives of different stakeholders through adopting a flexible approach 
to implementation and remediation. This meant, for instance, depending on the stakes 
and cooperativeness of stakeholders, balancing the recourse to self-implementation or 
to stronger enforcement, demonstrating flexibility in their approach to 
implementation. For example, when needed, and especially for serious issues, CAF 
did leverage the drive along the supply chain while working directly with cleaning 
suppliers for more minor issues. Also, when stakeholders lost sight of their role in 
implementation, the CAF team did refer to mandatory accessorial liability. This was 
one of the key threats that could possibly be used for enforcement. Finally, the 
principle of flexibility applied to the standard and its associated instruments allowed 
for ongoing learning and improvement of the standard and the production of 
guidelines and interpretations of the core principles and legal framework as both of 
these and the practices of stakeholders change over time.  
B Proposal for Legal Reform 
CAF-certified buildings are run by best-practice cleaning industry leaders in Australia 
in terms of their efforts to secure improved pay and conditions for cleaners. Even with 
this type of ethical stakeholder, in the current competitive industry environment, CAF 
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efforts to ensure compliance with labour standards is ongoing and a number of issues 
continue to occur with some certified buildings at annual health checks.116 Also, the 
voluntary standards set by CAF only apply to 20 or so buildings in capital cities; small 
microcosm of the commercial and retail buildings that have to be cleaned by cleaning 
workers throughout the country every day. This raises the question as to how to 
systematically address extensive labour abuses in the vast, competitive Australian 
commercial cleaning market not participating in CAF.  
In light of these limitations of the current scope of CAF, in the mid-term, we foresee 
the necessity of a mandatory federal legislative scheme of regulating whole supply 
chains in the Australian cleaning industry in order to improve the pay and conditions 
of vulnerable cleaning workers. Endemic recalcitrance in the cleaning industry117 
demands a systematic response and confirms this argument in favour of applying a 
specific set of additional, mandatory laws to that industry. As evidenced by parts of 
our discussion in this article, even when building owners have made the decision to 
participate in CAF, some of those owners are still reluctant to exercise their leverage 
in order to monitor labour standards in their own supply chains. However, if building 
owners had mandatory liabilities for labour abuses and responsibilities to monitor 
supply chains in order to secure compliance with minimum pay and conditions 
standards, there could be a much more programmatic and quicker improvement to 
the conditions of cleaning workers throughout the cleaning industry than CAF has 
been able to achieve over a seven year period.   
Such a proposal is consistent with Davidov’s analysis where he argues that the 
cleaning industry is a special case requiring industry specific regulation.118 As 
Davidov states, where the universalism of labour law fails to protect a sub-set of 
workers ‘special treatment by way of selective regulations could be justified’.119 But 
further to Davidov’s argument (which involves analysis of law from overseas), we 
urge that the format of any such proposed laws considered by the Australian 
Parliament heed the lessons of CAF’s experience with securing rectification of non-
compliance.  That is, a preferable legislative scheme might take the form of a two-tier 
structure. If a building is certified by CAF and currently operating in compliance with 
the CAF regime, the owner of that building might have a reasonable excuse (in relation 
to that building) to not comply with a (more robust) mandatory set of legislative 
provisions imposing supply chain liabilities and monitoring responsibilities (backed 
up by civil and/or criminal penalties).  
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These mandatory laws might include a secondary liability of supply chain participants 
beyond the direct employer for wage (and superannuation) underpayments (only) or 
a secondary liability for wage underpayments as well as other labour violations. This 
could be achieved by enacting a worker right to recover wages and other legal 
minimum entitlements from supply chain participants beyond the direct employer, in 
the event that their direct employer has failed to provide them those entitlements. The 
supply chain participant would then have the ability to claim back the amounts paid 
to workers from the direct employer.120 Alternatively or additionally, the 
responsibilities of firms at the apex of cleaning supply chains could take the form of 
proactive monitoring and disclosure obligations (with strict penalties applying for not 
carrying out those obligations).  One example is the responsibilities of clothing 
retailers under the Australian Textile and Footwear (‘TCF’) scheme (which we will 
now discuss). 
The proposed two-tiered approach could be adapted from an actual existing 
mandatory scheme of supply chain regulation in the TCF industry which already has 
this structure under the Ethical Clothing Trades Extended Responsibility Scheme 2004 
(NSW).121 This mandatory legislative instrument applies to all retailers, wherever 
domiciled, who sell clothing products within New South Wales.122 However, under 
this binding legislative instrument, clothing retailers who are signatories to or 
accredited under and are acting in compliance with the ‘voluntary’ Homeworkers 
Code of Practice (‘HWCP’) have a reasonable excuse not to comply with the 
mandatory provisions.123 This mandatory retailer code is part of a package of federal 
and State mandatory rules that regulate to protect vulnerable TCF workers in 
Australia.124 This mandatory code is a crucial component of that package because it 
applies specifically to retailers who are not the direct employers of clothing 
manufacturing workers but who are located at the apex of clothing supply chains. This 
mandatory code imposes upon clothing retailers (and those retailers’ suppliers) 
record-keeping and reactive and proactive obligations to fully disclose supply chain 
contract details to regulators.125 The code also imports standardised, enforceable 
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provisions into retailers’ contracts with their clothing suppliers, requiring suppliers to 
inform retailers about all locations where domestic apparel manufacture is conducted, 
or else risk losing their contracts with the retailer.126 The above mentioned provisions 
exempting the application of the mandatory code to retailers signatory to and 
operating in compliance with the ‘voluntary’ HWCP, has completely transformed the 
practical enforceability of the HWCP. As Nossar et al explain:127  
‘Failure, by either retailers or suppliers, to comply with the “voluntary” HWCP 
provisions now incurs the full application of the entire mandatory code regime, which 
is tougher in the scope – and severity – of the obligations imposed and is also 
enforceable in court with substantial financial penalties upon conviction’. ‘ 
As such there was a significant increase in the number of signatories to the HWCP 
following the introduction of mandatory responsibilities. 
Adapting and applying this type of TCF regulation to the cleaning industry, combined 
with improved government funding of CAF, might secure the future of CAF by 
building it into an Australian legislative scheme. A further benefit of the two-tier 
scheme is that it could potentially see rapid growth in the number of business 
stakeholders participating in CAF. Encouraging participation in CAF would mean 
that compliance could be boosted by funnelling regulatees into a pro-active scheme 
which is dedicated to substantive compliance.  It may be preferable to have a multi-
stakeholder framework such as CAF involved in securing compliance rather than 
leaving the difficult task of compliance solely to under-resourced government 
regulators. However, a concerted campaign for industry specific legislation would be 
required as the current federal government has not made public any plans to further 
regulate the cleaning industry, despite the mounting evidence that current laws are 
inadequate to address widespread labour law non-compliance in that industry. 
Alongside the lofty recommendation that the federal Parliament should enact 
legislation, a fallback option for the short term, or a precursor to such a legislative 
scheme, would be for the federal government to require compliance with the CAF in 
relation to all federal government buildings as part of its public procurement policy. 
This could considerably enhance compliance in a sector of the cleaning industry given 
the government’s considerable property portfolio. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Given extensive non-compliance with labour standards in the Australian cleaning 
industry, CAF was established in 2013 to secure the participation of all of the 
stakeholders in the cleaning supply chain in achieving compliance with minimum 
labour standards, including those contained in the relevant federal modern award. To 
improve the pay and conditions of cleaning workers, the raison d’être of CAF has been 




to leverage the collective supply chain power of all the business participants in the 
cleaning supply chain including building owners. Through a range of measures 
including independent audits, worker engagement and tender controls, CAF 
identifies underpayments and other labour exploitation. In the two pilots of the CAF 
certification program and when CAF went to market in 2019, there have been either 
major or minor labour issues identified in almost every cleaning supply chain subject 
to the CAF certification processes.128 Once these non-compliances with labour 
standards have been identified, CAF has undertaken a sometimes lengthy liaison with 
stakeholders in order to convince  business owners and their facilities managers to use 
their leverage to encourage compliance in businesses below and/or to get the 
employing cleaning company to directly rectify labour issues. The CAF Certification 
Panel only certifies an owner’s building once the relevant stakeholders can provide 
evidence that the non-compliance has been rectified. Through this process, CAF has 
been able to improve the labour conditions of the cleaning workers in the buildings of 
owners participating in CAF and certify at least 20 mostly large commercial and retail 
properties. The measures that CAF has undertaken to rectify non-compliance clearly 
show that supply chains can be regulated to improve the pay and conditions of 
workers because of the building owner’s existing regulatory capacity and their 
decision to co-operate with an organisation such as CAF. Our findings demonstrate 
that the implementation of CAF exposed serious labour standard implementation 
issues in the cleaning supply chain and provided an efficient method of remediation. 
It shows that a co-regulation framework that leverages the power of the organisations 
placed at the apex of the supply chain can be an efficient supplement to legal 
enforcement.129 Given the significant success of CAF, where there is stakeholder 
willingness, stakeholders might consider establishing multi-stakeholder frameworks 
adapted from the CAF model to address labour standards non-compliance in other 
industries.   
Even within CAF, there is still some considerable lead firm resistance to assisting CAF 
to address labour exploitation. Furthermore, the process of rectifying non-compliance 
is an ongoing challenge and non-government organisations such as CAF urgently 
need more government assistance and funding to make a broader impact across an 
entire industry. The voluntary nature of the scheme means that CAF-compliant 
businesses remain a relatively small island of improved labour practices surrounded 
by a broader, ferociously competitive industry where labour standards are routinely 
thwarted because cleaning is treated as a cost to be minimised. Thus, we have argued 
that the voluntary should be made mandatory. Our proposal is that those businesses 
that are CAF members and operating in compliance with CAF standards have a 
reasonable excuse to not comply with a more robust, new federal legislative scheme 
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creating extended liability of lead firms at the apex of cleaning supply chains for 
compliance with labour standards. 
 
